The Real Front Is in Tehran
“A state rarely falls under the blows of the
enemy; it falls when its internal divisions become stronger than the external
threat.”
— Niccolò
Machiavelli
We are on March
13, 2026, the fourteenth day of a conflict that Washington and Tel Aviv present
as already won. Ali Khamenei Sr. has been eliminated. More than 5,000 Iranian
military targets have been struck. Tehran’s ballistic capabilities have dropped
by nearly 90% (figure officially confirmed this morning by the U.S. Department
of War during the Hegseth-Caine press conference). The regime has lost dozens
of ships and launchers. Yet a missile still hit a residential area north of
Israel this morning. Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains reduced by more
than 95%, Brent exceeds $105 a barrel, and global economic costs are mounting.
Why this
proclamation of military victory when nothing is over? Because the Iranians
have precisely identified the real American center of gravity: U.S. public
opinion, vulnerable to economic factors. To reach it, they have chosen a
deliberate and calculated a strategy of attrition — prolonging the war by all
possible asymmetric means. On the other side, the United States has indeed
secured an undeniable military victory. But they have not yet found the key to
end the conflict.
Ali Larijani: The Strategist of Prolonged Nuisance
Larijani
today embodies the most dangerous Iranian strategy for Washington: winning the
war of time. Former nuclear negotiator and former Speaker of Parliament, he had
the direct ear of the late Supreme Leader. Reinstalled in August 2025 as
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he coordinates the
operational response. His brothers have built a solid institutional
network.
In recent
hours’ statements, he is the one maintaining the maritime blockade lever,
ensuring — despite communication difficulties — continuity with the remaining
active IRGC units. He is steering a long resistance rather than a suicidal
frontal confrontation.
Mojtaba
Khamenei, designated Supreme Leader on March 9, remains in the background. His
first public communication on March 12 was written; consistent reports mention
injuries from the initial strikes.
In these
conditions, Larijani exercises a de facto decision-making role, precisely the
one that allows him to calibrate the nuisance without tipping into adventurism.
The Ahmadinejad Legacy and Internal Tensions
Facing him,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s legacy remains alive. Independent sources confirm that
this other radical figure is unharmed and placed in safety after the first
strikes. His supporters remain influential among popular bases and certain
hardline IRGC units.
Historically,
Larijani and Ahmadinejad clashed: the former resigned in 2007 over a line he
judged too risky, with public confrontations between 2010 and 2013 on power and
corruption. Khamenei Sr. had then ruled in favor of institutional stability.
This
tension has not disappeared. It is now at the heart of Iran’s calculation:
Larijani must channel this popular radicalism to serve a prolonged nuisance,
without letting it slip into uncontrollable decisions.
The Critical Variables
This is
where the loyalty of those who hold the weapons becomes decisive. And this
loyalty passes through three additional variables often overlooked: the Iranian
street, ethnic minorities, and the regular army (Artesh).
The
population has been enduring a direct economic shock for fourteen days —
shortages, inflation, power cuts, rationing. Reliable sources report limited
but persistent demonstrations in several cities around daily survival issues.
These movements recall 2019 and 2022: real fatigue, but which, for now, has not
turned into open revolt.
The regime
is betting that the perception of a national resistance against external
aggression can still maintain urban cohesion. As for ethnic minorities — Kurds,
Baluchis, Arabs of Ahvaz, Turkmens, Azeris, representing nearly 40% of the
population — verified reports mention increased activity by Baluchi armed
groups in the southeast and isolated incidents in Kurdish areas. Even if a
reaction from these groups remains possible, it appears highly improbable in
the current context due to the regime’s tight surveillance and internal
divisions within these communities. Their neutrality or loyalty nonetheless
conditions the stability of peripheral provinces where sensitives sites are
located.
Larijani,
with his institutional approach, seems for now to contain these fractures;
Ahmadinejad, symbol of the dispossessed populism, could mobilize or exacerbate
them depending on the turn events take.
To these
two variables is added an actor still inactive but potentially decisive: the
regular Iranian army (Artesh). Unlike the Revolutionary Guards, the Artesh was
not directly targeted in the first strikes and retains the bulk of its
conventional capabilities (armor, aviation, infantry). It remains in the
background, faithful to its tradition of professionalism and separation from
the IRGC.
If Larijani
or the top leadership decided to involve it fully — whether to stabilize the
regime or for more classical defense — it could become the factor that tips the
internal balance. Its loyalty (or possible neutrality) remains a major card yet
unplayed.
The Real Battlefield
On March
13, 2026, American public opinion seems to be entering a critical phase of
disengagement. The initial military successes — elimination of Ali Khamenei and
destruction of a large part of the ballistic arsenal — had generated initial
support. But the prospects of an economic quagmire now appear to be the real
arbiter of the conflict.
The first
polls published in recent days by Ipsos and Quinnipiac University Poll show a
rapid shift: a relative majority of voters now expresses opposition to
continuing the war, while a growing share of the population expects a long
conflict.
At the same
time, the energy shock is becoming the main domestic front. With Brent
exceeding $105 and a barrel, and global economic costs are mounting, the
question of the war’s cost is imposing itself on American households’ daily
lives.
Another
lock remains: public opinion massively rejects the idea of ground engagement.
The hypothesis of “boots on the ground” remains politically toxic, severely
limiting Washington’s strategic room for maneuver.
In other
words, the Iranian strategy of attrition seeks less to reverse the military
balance of power than to turn a tactical defeat into an internal crisis of
confidence in the United States. In this equation, the real battlefield is no
longer only the Strait of Hormuz, but the wallet and patience of the American
citizen.
American Options and Possible Outcomes
On their
side, the United States has won the military phase hands down. The destruction
is massive, the Iranian chain of command has been decapitated, ballistic and
conventional naval capabilities are largely degraded. This victory is
undeniable and documented. Yet they have not found the key to turn this
military success into a political gain.
International
naval escorts, demining operations, targeted strikes on mine-layers: all these
measures are underway, but they do not break the Iranian will to endure.
Diplomacy is advancing slowly. An indirect negotiation remains theoretically
possible, but it would require Washington to accept a compromise on Iran’s
residual capabilities — a politically sensitive point.
As long as
internal Iranian loyalty holds, as long as Larijani manages to orchestrate this
nuisance without a major fracture, the United States risk getting bogged down
in a quagmire where conventional military force alone is no longer enough.
Four outcomes are emerging.
The first, the most probable: the Iranian nuisance successfully erodes
American public opinion progressively. Larijani maintains cohesion (street
contained, minorities neutralized, Ahmadinejad radicalism channeled, Artesh in
reserve). The war stretches over several weeks, economic costs mount, and
Washington ends up seeking a negotiated exit.
The second, the riskiest: an internal Iranian fracture (mistrust between Larijani and radicals,
street exasperation or ethnic agitation) causes the nuisance strategy to
implode before American opinion cracks. The United States then wins quickly,
but at the price of unpredictable regional chaos.
The third, the most unpredictable: uncontrolled escalation where radicalism
takes over and Washington, faced with chaotic nuisance, finds itself forced
into a hasty withdrawal or costly intensification.
The fourth, the most desirable for Washington: the final blow. This morning’s
Hegseth-Caine press conference seems to confirm this path: announcement of “the
most intense wave of strikes” and direct message to the new Supreme Leader
Mojtaba Khamenei.
It is
legitimate to think of an immediate, strong and targeted neutralization of
decision centers or a decisive strike on the summit of Iranian power. This course
of action would cause the collapse of the regime or its capitulation, in order
to break its will to resist once and for all.
Conclusion
The history
of the Islamic Republic shows that true centers of gravity are rarely those
that one bombs. They are often found in internal resilience and external
perception.
Today,
between the corridors of power in Tehran and the loyalty of those who hold the
weapons, Iran has chosen to play on the ground where the United States is most
vulnerable: time and the economy.
As long as
this equation is not reversed, the proclaimed military victory will remain
incomplete. The war continues. And it is now being played out where few bombs
can reach.
Nothing
rules out that a decisive strike could come as early as this Friday, March 13,
in the evening. But as long as the regime holds, the proclaimed victory is not
yet the real victory.
#IranWar
#Hormuz #Geopolitics #Iran
@ISW @CENTCOM
@EliotHiggins @ianbremmer
