The War Against Iran

 

The Real Front Is in Tehran

 

 “A state rarely falls under the blows of the enemy; it falls when its internal divisions become stronger than the external threat.”

— Niccolò Machiavelli

 

We are on March 13, 2026, the fourteenth day of a conflict that Washington and Tel Aviv present as already won. Ali Khamenei Sr. has been eliminated. More than 5,000 Iranian military targets have been struck. Tehran’s ballistic capabilities have dropped by nearly 90% (figure officially confirmed this morning by the U.S. Department of War during the Hegseth-Caine press conference). The regime has lost dozens of ships and launchers. Yet a missile still hit a residential area north of Israel this morning. Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains reduced by more than 95%, Brent exceeds $105 a barrel, and global economic costs are mounting.

Why this proclamation of military victory when nothing is over? Because the Iranians have precisely identified the real American center of gravity: U.S. public opinion, vulnerable to economic factors. To reach it, they have chosen a deliberate and calculated a strategy of attrition — prolonging the war by all possible asymmetric means. On the other side, the United States has indeed secured an undeniable military victory. But they have not yet found the key to end the conflict.

Ali Larijani: The Strategist of Prolonged Nuisance

Larijani today embodies the most dangerous Iranian strategy for Washington: winning the war of time. Former nuclear negotiator and former Speaker of Parliament, he had the direct ear of the late Supreme Leader. Reinstalled in August 2025 as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he coordinates the operational response. His brothers have built a solid institutional network. 

In recent hours’ statements, he is the one maintaining the maritime blockade lever, ensuring — despite communication difficulties — continuity with the remaining active IRGC units. He is steering a long resistance rather than a suicidal frontal confrontation.

Mojtaba Khamenei, designated Supreme Leader on March 9, remains in the background. His first public communication on March 12 was written; consistent reports mention injuries from the initial strikes. 

In these conditions, Larijani exercises a de facto decision-making role, precisely the one that allows him to calibrate the nuisance without tipping into adventurism.

The Ahmadinejad Legacy and Internal Tensions

Facing him, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s legacy remains alive. Independent sources confirm that this other radical figure is unharmed and placed in safety after the first strikes. His supporters remain influential among popular bases and certain hardline IRGC units. 

Historically, Larijani and Ahmadinejad clashed: the former resigned in 2007 over a line he judged too risky, with public confrontations between 2010 and 2013 on power and corruption. Khamenei Sr. had then ruled in favor of institutional stability.

This tension has not disappeared. It is now at the heart of Iran’s calculation: Larijani must channel this popular radicalism to serve a prolonged nuisance, without letting it slip into uncontrollable decisions.

The Critical Variables

This is where the loyalty of those who hold the weapons becomes decisive. And this loyalty passes through three additional variables often overlooked: the Iranian street, ethnic minorities, and the regular army (Artesh).

The population has been enduring a direct economic shock for fourteen days — shortages, inflation, power cuts, rationing. Reliable sources report limited but persistent demonstrations in several cities around daily survival issues. These movements recall 2019 and 2022: real fatigue, but which, for now, has not turned into open revolt.

The regime is betting that the perception of a national resistance against external aggression can still maintain urban cohesion. As for ethnic minorities — Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs of Ahvaz, Turkmens, Azeris, representing nearly 40% of the population — verified reports mention increased activity by Baluchi armed groups in the southeast and isolated incidents in Kurdish areas. Even if a reaction from these groups remains possible, it appears highly improbable in the current context due to the regime’s tight surveillance and internal divisions within these communities. Their neutrality or loyalty nonetheless conditions the stability of peripheral provinces where sensitives sites are located.

Larijani, with his institutional approach, seems for now to contain these fractures; Ahmadinejad, symbol of the dispossessed populism, could mobilize or exacerbate them depending on the turn events take.

To these two variables is added an actor still inactive but potentially decisive: the regular Iranian army (Artesh). Unlike the Revolutionary Guards, the Artesh was not directly targeted in the first strikes and retains the bulk of its conventional capabilities (armor, aviation, infantry). It remains in the background, faithful to its tradition of professionalism and separation from the IRGC.

If Larijani or the top leadership decided to involve it fully — whether to stabilize the regime or for more classical defense — it could become the factor that tips the internal balance. Its loyalty (or possible neutrality) remains a major card yet unplayed.

The Real Battlefield

On March 13, 2026, American public opinion seems to be entering a critical phase of disengagement. The initial military successes — elimination of Ali Khamenei and destruction of a large part of the ballistic arsenal — had generated initial support. But the prospects of an economic quagmire now appear to be the real arbiter of the conflict.

The first polls published in recent days by Ipsos and Quinnipiac University Poll show a rapid shift: a relative majority of voters now expresses opposition to continuing the war, while a growing share of the population expects a long conflict.

At the same time, the energy shock is becoming the main domestic front. With Brent exceeding $105 and a barrel, and global economic costs are mounting, the question of the war’s cost is imposing itself on American households’ daily lives.

Another lock remains: public opinion massively rejects the idea of ground engagement. The hypothesis of “boots on the ground” remains politically toxic, severely limiting Washington’s strategic room for maneuver.

In other words, the Iranian strategy of attrition seeks less to reverse the military balance of power than to turn a tactical defeat into an internal crisis of confidence in the United States. In this equation, the real battlefield is no longer only the Strait of Hormuz, but the wallet and patience of the American citizen.

American Options and Possible Outcomes

On their side, the United States has won the military phase hands down. The destruction is massive, the Iranian chain of command has been decapitated, ballistic and conventional naval capabilities are largely degraded. This victory is undeniable and documented. Yet they have not found the key to turn this military success into a political gain.

International naval escorts, demining operations, targeted strikes on mine-layers: all these measures are underway, but they do not break the Iranian will to endure. Diplomacy is advancing slowly. An indirect negotiation remains theoretically possible, but it would require Washington to accept a compromise on Iran’s residual capabilities — a politically sensitive point.

As long as internal Iranian loyalty holds, as long as Larijani manages to orchestrate this nuisance without a major fracture, the United States risk getting bogged down in a quagmire where conventional military force alone is no longer enough.

Four outcomes are emerging.

The first, the most probable: the Iranian nuisance successfully erodes American public opinion progressively. Larijani maintains cohesion (street contained, minorities neutralized, Ahmadinejad radicalism channeled, Artesh in reserve). The war stretches over several weeks, economic costs mount, and Washington ends up seeking a negotiated exit.

The second, the riskiest: an internal Iranian fracture (mistrust between Larijani and radicals, street exasperation or ethnic agitation) causes the nuisance strategy to implode before American opinion cracks. The United States then wins quickly, but at the price of unpredictable regional chaos.

The third, the most unpredictable: uncontrolled escalation where radicalism takes over and Washington, faced with chaotic nuisance, finds itself forced into a hasty withdrawal or costly intensification.

The fourth, the most desirable for Washington: the final blow. This morning’s Hegseth-Caine press conference seems to confirm this path: announcement of “the most intense wave of strikes” and direct message to the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. 

It is legitimate to think of an immediate, strong and targeted neutralization of decision centers or a decisive strike on the summit of Iranian power. This course of action would cause the collapse of the regime or its capitulation, in order to break its will to resist once and for all.

Conclusion

The history of the Islamic Republic shows that true centers of gravity are rarely those that one bombs. They are often found in internal resilience and external perception. 

Today, between the corridors of power in Tehran and the loyalty of those who hold the weapons, Iran has chosen to play on the ground where the United States is most vulnerable: time and the economy. 

As long as this equation is not reversed, the proclaimed military victory will remain incomplete. The war continues. And it is now being played out where few bombs can reach.

Nothing rules out that a decisive strike could come as early as this Friday, March 13, in the evening. But as long as the regime holds, the proclaimed victory is not yet the real victory.

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